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Antitrust: Agreement to Exchange Price
Information Violates Sherman Act
Defendants, producers of 90 percent of the corrugated con-
tainers in the southeastern United States, exchanged on request
the most recent prices charged or quoted to specific customers.
Information was exchanged infrequently and irregularly and
often the information sought was available from the customers
themselves. The product was basically a homogeneous one for
which the demand was inelastic, and the industry was char-
acterized by excess capacity and a downward trend of slightly
varying prices. Even so, the number of manufacturers and
plants had increased because of the rapid growth of total de-
mand and the ease of entry into the industry. The government
brought a civil action charging a price fixing agreement in vio-
lation of section I of the Sherman Act.' The lower court found
no agreement to exchange information for the purpose of main-
taining price uniformity nor any restriction of price competition.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement to ex-
change prices had an anticompetitive effect on the industry in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Con-
tainer Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
As originally enacted in 1890, section 1 of the Sherman Act
was too broad to be applied literally- and the courts have had
to exercise substantial discretion in its application.2 While
agreements to fix or maintain prices were held to be unlawful
per se,3 other restraints upon interstate commerce were pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act only if they were unreasonable. 4
This "Rule of Reason" that developed from the case law is more
1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
3. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
4. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80
(1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). An
activity which is unlawful per se is an automatic antitrust violation
requiring no investigation into its actual or probable effect. An activity
which is not unlawful per se is unlawful only if it is unreasonable. G.
LAMAB & S. KITTELLE, TRADE ASsOcIATION LAW AND PRAcTICE 22 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Liwj.
CASE COMMENT
than a simple test of whether competition has been restrained.
Since a restraint may regulate or even promote competition, only
those restraints that suppress or destroy competition are deemed
unreasonable. The factors to be considered in determining rea-
sonableness are the nature of the business involved, the con-
dition of the industry both before and after the restraint was
in effect, the nature, history and purpose of the restraint, and
the actual and probable effects of the restraint.5
Both sellers and buyers have a legitimate interest in main-
taining a free flow of market information.6 Sellers base their
production programs on their knowledge of market behavior,
and buyers can purchase more wisely when given access to the
information. This results in a benefit to society as a whole by
making competition more workable. Trade associations or co-
operative exchanges of market data by trade rivals are appropri-
ate mechanisms for forwarding all of these interests.7 The
question to be asked in applying the "Rule of Reason" is whether
such cooperation promotes informed though independent decision
making or common judgment and behavior.8
The Supreme Court has applied the "Rule of Reason" to the
exchange of market information by trade associations in a num-
ber of cases.9 Illustrative of these is Maple Flooring Manu-
facturers Association v. United States0 where association mem-
bers controlling 70 percent of the production of certain types of
flooring received information regarding average cost figures for
the flooring," freight rates from a fixed point12 and statistics
detailing past sales.13 Despite the stabilizing effect on the in-
5. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
6. Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and the
Legality of Trade Association Activities, 21 U. CEr. L. Rnv. 527, 542
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Stocking].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 543.
9. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936);
Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); See
Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
10. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
11. Id. at 566.
12. Id. at 566-67.
13. The trade association in Maple Flooring did not provide infor-
mation regarding current price quotations, the identity of specific cus-
tomers or details concerning new orders. However, the members at-
tended meetings where trade conditions were discussed and their
statistics were widely reported to trade journals, the Department of
Commerce and the Federal Reserve Bank.
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
dustry and the resultant uniformity of prices, the Supreme
Court did not find an unreasonable restraint of trade since the
association neither reached nor attempted to reach "any agree-
ment or any concerted action with respect to prices or pro-
duction or restraining competition."' 4
Various factors have emerged from the cases following
Maple Flooring as indicative of the reasonableness of the ex-
change of information between members of a trade association.5
Those factors are:
(1) Market structure or the collective power of the partici-
pants in the plan. The greater the market power of
the participants, the greater the danger of price uniform-
ity at an unnaturally high price level.
(2) Whether the participants must adhere to the exchanged
or published prices. While adherence may eliminate
price discrimination, it is likely that it amounts to a
method of fixing prices.'6
(3) Whether past sales prices, current list prices, or price
offers for future sales are reported. Reporting of
offers for future sales may inform other sellers that
they should charge a certain price, whether identical to
a competitor's or not. This practice would maintain
a given price structure or differential and reduce price
competition whereas the reporting of past or current
prices would not effectively accomplish this purpose,' 7
14. 268 U.S. at 586; accord, Sugar Institute Inc. v. United States,
297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936).
15. In Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S.
588 (1925), the exchange of price information on specific job contracts
was held to be lawful because the scheme was designed to prevent
fraud on the seller. The price uniformity did not result from an agree-
ment but from the competition meeting prices that became known
through other channels of communication. The Court also held that as
long as individual judgment in extending credit was preserved, the ex-
change of information concerning the credit worthiness of customers
was not unlawful even though not made public. Id. at 599-600.
In Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949), the
members sold about 95 percent of the tag products purchased and used
in the United States. The activities of the Institute consisted of the
compilation and coordination of comprehensive price lists, terms and
conditions of sales, and detailed definition and specifications for each
quality of tag product sold. Invoices were collected to verify reports
and failure to comply with the requirements and reports resulted in a
penalty. Buyers' access to the information-as opposed to sellers'-
was merely nominal. The court of appeals found no unreasonable
restraint of commerce and based its decision on the failure to show a
price fixing agreement. The court characterized the price lists as public
property and the reporting of off-list sales as merely reporting past
transactions. Id. at 462-66.
16. See Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 582-86
(1936).
17. However, if prices move slowly this may be just as effective as
reporting future prices. Also, if there is a small time lag, the reporting
of past prices may amount to the reporting o. current or future prices.
[Vol. 54:206
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and would more likely be upheld.'s(4) The frequency of reporting and the time lag between a
past sale and the report of its price. A small time lag
would permit another seller to know the price which he
must quote to a customer and thus would amount to
the reporting of current prices.19
(5) Whether the seller, buyer and particular transaction are
identified. If these facts are disclosed the seller might
feel pressure against deviating from the status quo since
all who receive this information will know who has
initiated a change. This information is not likely to have
any legitimate use and therefore would be a factor show-
ing unreasonableness. 2o
(6) Whether stock or inventory reports and estimates of fu-
ture production are made. While such information can
be very useful in analyzing market conditions, in the case
of an industry with a homogeneous product and a stable
market, estimates of future production suggest the use of
quotas. This is especially true where capacity exceeds
demand and relatively few companies have a consistent
share of the market.2 '
(7) Whether average cost figures are reported. Average cost
figures may help many small firms that experience dif-
ficulty in determining their costs. While this may cause
uniformity in the procedure for determining costs, it
should not by itself carry antitrust implications.22
(8) Whether off-list sales are reported. An off-list sale rep-
resents a sale made at a price other than the published
list price. Reporting of off-list sales adds to the pressure
not to deviate from list prices, especially where the
identity of the seller is also reported.
(9) Whether there is an inspection system. Since an in-
spection system may be necessary to enforce a price
or production fixing agreement but is not really neces-
sary to insure an accurate reporting scheme,23 its pres-
ence tends to show unreasonableness.
18. LArvm, supra note 4, at 51; see Miron, Antitrust Implications
of the Exchange of Business Information, 10 ANTiTRusT BuLL. 485, 497
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Miron].
19. The required frequency of reporting-annual, monthly, weekly
or daily-depends on the industry, the statistical program and the evi-
dence of an illegal purpose or agreement which the program may cause.
20. LATm, supra note 4, at 42; see Miron, supra note 18, at 496-97;
see also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 573
(1925) where the Court commented favorably on the omission of the
names of sellers and purchasers in the information exchanged. It should
be noted that special circumstances may relax this rule of thumb against
disclosure of individual data, as in Cement Manufacturers where in-
formation on specific job contracts was needed to prevent fraud on the
sellers by the buyers. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n V. United States,
268 U.S. 588, 603-04 (1925).
21. LATm, supra note 4, at 41, 49-50.
22. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S,
563, 568-70 (1925).
23. LAm, supra note 4, at 47-49; see American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410 (1921). It is usually in the
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(10) Whether there are penalties for failure to make the re-
quired reports or for making inaccurate reports. Gen-
eally the existence of such penalties raises suspicions
of unlawful agreement.24
(11) Whether meetings among the participants or competitors
take place. There is generally no prohibition against
meeting to discuss common problems, the condition of
the industry, etc., unless the meetings provide evidence
of an unlawful agreement.25
(12) Whether there is an analysis of the statistics published
with the other information. This may give rise to the
inference that collective judgment has replaced indi-
vidual judgment.26
(13) Whether the exchanged information is available to buy-
ers or the public. If information is not available to
buyers, the sellers may have an unfair advantage.27
(14) Whether nonmember competitors of an association or
plan are permitted to have access to the plan. Partici-
pation in a statistical program should not be withheld if
a competitive advantage to members would result in an
unreasonable restraint of trade.28
These factors or elements of reasonableness, when con-
sidered together, permit one to conclude that the critical ques-
tion is whether the exchange of information restricts individual
decision-making, resulting in an unreasonable restraint of
trade.29  These factors serve as the basis for analyzing the
Container opinion.
seller's own interest to make his reports accurately because only if all
sellers do this will the published information be accurate and thus useful.
24. LAm, supra note 4, at 47-49. But see Tag Mfrs. Institute v.
FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 461, (1st Cir. 1949), where the court held that a valid
reporting scheme is not made invalid by the existence of penalties. This
statement merely means that a penalty system alone will not cause an
agreement to be unreasonable. This is also true of the other factors,
since they must be considered together in determining reasonableness.
25. LAMB, supra note 4, at 50; see Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1925); American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 396-410 (1921); cf. Miron, supra
note 18, at 497.
26. LAmB, supra note 4, at 49-50; see American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States 257 U.S. 377, 410 (:1921). See also Miron, supra
note 18, at 496.
27. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 596-97
(1936); LAm, supra note 4, at 43-55; see Miron, supra note 18, at
494-95. It is not clear to what extent sellers must make the information
available to buyers or the public. In Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), there was wide dissemination, while
in Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949), information
was available only at great expense to those who desired it. The ex-
change of information in both of these cases was held to be reasonable.
28. LAwm, supra note 4, at 47. It should be noted that members of
a program may desire to include competitors in their statistics to make
them more meaningful.
29. LAM, supra note 4, at 30 states that the general rule of thumb
for keeping within the antitrust laws is that:
[T]here [can] be no agreements, express or implied, which
[Vol. 54:206
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After distinguishing earlier decisions involving the exchange
of price information,20 the majority in Container analyzed the
factors involved in the determination of reasonableness. The
important facts as the majority saw them were the market struc-
ture, the homogeneous nature of the product and the inelasticity
of the demand. These facts made price the most important
variable in the competition even though prices had stabilized in
a slightly downward trend. The majority felt that this stabi-
lizing effect constituted a limitation or reduction of price com-
petition and held that such effect was unlawful per se under
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Company.31
Both the concurring and dissenting opinions repudiated the
need to find a violation per se. The dissent argued that the
government had failed to prove either a purpose or effect of
restraining competition -32 while the concurring opinion stated
that the probability of such effect was so high that the evi-
dence offered was sufficient.83
While the majority appears to rely on the per se rule of
Socony, it does examine the market structure, the nature of the
product, the effect of the exchange of prices and some of the
factors previously discussed. An examination of these factors
is generally inconsistent with a per se test and is more appro-
priate to a reasonableness test. If the majority intended a rea-
sonableness test their reliance on Socony is misplaced. The most
likely interpretation-though never explicitly stated-is that the
majority analyzed those factors associated with a reasonable-
ness test to determine if there was a price fixing agreement.
restrict the individual's freedom to make independent business
decisions .... [The exchange of information] should afford
enlightenment and possibly a forum for . . . [discussing mutual
problems and interests] but it should not substitute group judg-
ment for that of the individual in the day-to-day conduct of
the latter's business.
30. 393 U.S. at 334-35.
31. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The Court also referred to American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), and
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) as
analogous cases but did not rely on them. 393 U.S. at 337.
32. The dissent found that neither of these alternatives was sup-
ported by the evidence or the lower court's findings of fact. The effect
of restraining competition was supported only by the government's
theoretical assumption, which was adopted by both the majority and con-
curring opinions, that prices would have fallen further than they did if
price information had not been exchanged. Thus, in accordance with
the "Rule of Reason" the dissent found that exchanged information was
used to reach an individual price decision and thus the exchange was
reasonable. 393 U.S. at 343-47.
33. Id. at 339.
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Once they decided a price fixing agreement existed, the appli-
cation of the per se rule became appropriate.
There seems to be no reason for the sudden departure of
the majority from the "Rule of Reason" in analyzing the ex-
change of information among competitors. While it is true, as
the opinion points out, that the facts of Container are not
identical to any prior case, it does not follow that the reasoning
of those cases should be disregarded, especially when no basis for
the per se approach is asserted. The broad language of Socony
that "stabilization is but one form of manipulation"3 4 is in con-
flict with Maple Flooring. There the Court said that while the
exchange of price information has a stabilizing effect and re-
sults in price uniformity, this stabilization is not an unreason-
able restraint of commerce or in any respect unlawful. 5  The
Socony Court distinguished Maple Flooring by pointing out that
the issue in the latter was the existence of a price fixing agree-
ment.38 The Court in Container did not find the existence of
an express price fixing agreement, but merely an effect on prices
caused by an agreement to exchange price information.37 It thus
appears that the facts of Container are closer to Maple Flooring
and the line of cases using the "Rule of Reason" than Socony
and the line of cases holding that price fixing agreements are
illegal per se. Therefore, it was error for the Court to apply the
per se rule of Socony.
Assuming that the "Rule of Reason" should have been ap-
plied in Container, the previously isolated factors should have
been employed to determine the reasonableness of the exchange
of price information. In lieu of this detailed analysis however,
the majority merely assumed that the combination of excess ca-
pacity and increased number of sellers could only mean that there
were excess profits attracting the new sellers into the industry.38
While this was a possible inference, it was by no means a neces-
sary one, especially in light of greater demand and a downward
trend of prices. The ease of entry and the growth in the number
of sellers suggested the industry was not in danger of becoming
oligopolistic. Moreover, the majority seemed to ignore important
34. 310 U.S. at 223.
35. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582
(1925); accord Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598
(1936).
36. 310 U.S. at 217.
37. 393 U.S. at 335-37.




findings of fact by the trial court, such as the highly competitive
nature of the industry, the use of independent business judgment
in setting prices,3 9 the lack of uniformity, harmony, stability or
parallelism in prices, and the downward trend of prices while the
costs of labor and supplies were rising.
Had the Court analyzed reasonableness in terms of the
factors previously set forth, it would have found an exchange
of information scheme that was generally less comprehensive
than that of any case previously discussed, especially that of
Maple Flooring. The information was exchanged infrequently
and irregularly, the buyers were aware of the prices quoted,40
the information was generally restricted to the requesting
seller and not widely circulated, there was no penalty for
refusal to supply information, there was no exchange of pro-
duction, stock or cost information, there was no evidence that
the scheme was restricted to the named defendants and there
was no statistical analysis of the exchanged information. Col-
lectively, these factors tend to show that the setting of prices
resulted from independent business judgment and not from
an industry-wide mandate.
A comparison of the facts of Container with the factors of
reasonableness reveals that the weight of the evidence sup-
ports the position of the dissent that the exchange of informa-
tion did not have an anticompetitive effect. It appears that the
majority has applied precedent incorrectly by following the per
se rule of Socony instead of the reasonableness test of Maple
Flooring. Applying the general standard of reasonableness, the
slight change, if any, in the industry due to the exchange of price
information, the failure to prove an anticompetitive effect on
the industry and the fact that the exchange of price information
did not deprive trade rivals of their independent judgment in
making business decisions,41 it must be concluded that there was
no unreasonable restraint of commerce.
39. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp.
18, 26-27 (M.D.N.C. 1967). At least 16 factors entered into the decision
to quote a specific price of which the exchanged price or the com-
petitor's price was just one.
40. Although all buyers did not have the exchanged price infor-
mation for all transactions, each one had it for each transaction in which
he was involved. Thus, when seller A requested seller B to report the
lasi price charged to buyer X, X also knew the price and was in the
DosItion of waiting for the best quote from at least two buyers.
11. Stocking, supra note 6, at 543.
19691

